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Abstract
This paper suggests a cause of low density in urban development or urban sprawl that has
not been given much attention in the literature. There have been a number of arguments put
forward for market failures that may account for urban sprawl, including incomplete pricing of
infrstructure, environmental externalities, and unpriced congestion. The problem analyzed here
is that urban growth creates bene￿ts for an entire urban area, but the costs of growth are borne
by individual neighborhoods. An externality problem arises because existing residents perceive the
costs associated with the new residents locating in their neighborhoods, but not the full bene￿ts
of new entrants which accrue to the city as a whole. The result is that existing residents have an
incentive to block new residents to their neighborhoods, resulting in cities that are less dense than is
optimal, or too sprawling. The paper models several di⁄erent types of urban growth, and examines
the optimal and local choice outcomes under each type. In the ￿rst model, population growth is
endogenous and the physical limits of the city are ￿xed. The second model examines the case in
which population growth in the region is given, but the city boundary is allowed to vary. We show
that in both cases the city will tend to be larger and less dense than is optimal. In each, we examine
the sensitivity of the model to the number of neighborhoods and to the size of infrastructure and
transportation costs. Finally, we examine optimal subsidies and see how they compare to current
policies such as impact fees on new development.
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01 Introduction:
This paper addresses an important externality in urban development that has received little attention
in the urban growth literature. There have been a number of arguments put forward about how
market failures may contribute to urban sprawl, including incomplete pricing of infrastructure, unpriced
congestion, (Brueckner, 2001, Wheaton, 1998), environmental externalities, (Wu, 2006), and property
taxes (Brueckner and Kim, 2003). The problem examined in this paper is that for growing urban
areas, growth creates bene￿ts for an entire urban area, but the costs of that growth are often borne
primarily by residents of the neighborhoods where the growth occurs. An externality problem arises
because existing residents perceive the local costs associated with admitting new residents, but not the
full bene￿ts which accrue to the city as a whole. The result is that existing residents have an incentive
to block new residents to their neighborhoods, resulting in cities that are less dense or too spread out
than is optimal.
The tendency of local neighborhoods to attempt to block or reduce the density of new development in
their own areas is ubiquitous in cities, but it has been given scant attention in the economics literature.
There is a fairly large literature addressing related issues having to do with the provision of public
goods, and zoning. The Tiebout model and many of its extensions examine neighborhood outcomes
where individual preferences over public goods are heterogenous and individuals can move costlessly
among neighborhoods. Households will sort into homogenous neighborhoods and there is some analysis
of conditions under which neighborhoods would be likely to block potential new residents having to
do with optimal public goods provision (Tiebout, 1959, Fischel, 1987). However, actions on the part
of residents in existing neighborhoods to try to block new development or, at a minimum, reduce
the density of any new development within their own borders is so prevalent, cutting across income
levels and neighborhood locations (urban and suburban) within cities, that it begs more analysis.
Opposition to new development in existing areas has elements of a NIMBY problem: ￿ not in my
backyard,￿ because there is both a public good to the city as a whole and a private or local bad.
Analysis of NIMBY problems has tended to focus on the siting of noxious facilities (Mitchell and
Carson (1986) and Feinerman, Finkelshtain, and Kan (2004)). The focus here is a new development in
exiting urban areas and the e⁄ect on urban size and urban density.
In a study of development projects in the San Francisco region, Pendall (1999) ￿nds that the reasons
for opposition to new in￿ll development range from concerns over increased tra¢ c, new infrastructure
requirements, and environmental concerns. Opposition to new development occurs across all income
levels, not just in high income areas, and anti-growth sentiment tends to be higher in slower growing
1communities. Fischel (2001) argues that such opposition is a rational response to the uncertainty
about the potential adverse e⁄ects of in￿ll development ￿homeowners are trying to prevent the small
probability of large losses in the absence of insurance against such losses.
Local residents are often successful at blocking new development because land use is determined
at the local level (Downs, 2005). Particularly as regions become developed, single family residents can
become major players in local land-use decisions, along with urban planners, and developers (Fischel,
1978). Regions may develop comprehensive plans for the density and location of new development,
but increasingly the aspect of those plans that puts development into existing urban areas is being
undermined by the resistance of local residents (Downs, 2005, and Johnston, et al. 1991).
We develop a model of a growing urban area and examine the e⁄ects on urban density and size
of local decisions to block new development. We assume that new residents want to move into the
city, and we focus on the decision of local communities to admit new residents, and on where those
new residents will be located ￿in existing neighborhoods or in the periphery of the city. The decision-
makers are assumed to be existing local neighborhoods that have some ability to decide how many new
residents to admit. Previous economic models of cities and urban growth have focused on the choices
of individual agents who choose locations to maximize their own welfare (Nechyba and Walsh, 2004,
Glaeser, 2007). We abstract from individual location choices, and focus instead on the choices faced
by local neighborhoods about whether to accept new residents. Instead of a general equilibrium model
of the urban area, that includes e⁄ects on land/housing prices and endogenous transportation costs
(e.g. Glaeser, 2005; Mills, 1972 , Brueckner, 2001, Knaap et al, 2001, Epple and Seig, 1999), our model
includes existing neighborhoods in an urban area and a peripheral region that can be developed to
address the trade-o⁄s faced by each neighborhood. Knaap et al (2001) and Knaap and Hopkins (1999)
examine models with e¢ cient investment in urban infrastructure. Unlike ours, these models do not
capture external e⁄ects nor account for the existence of congestion costs.
Our focus is on growing urban areas where population increases facilitate the positive e⁄ects of
growth. Growing urban areas have been shown to have positive economic bene￿ts for city residents
in a number of ways. Economic historians have documented the strong positive correlation between
growth and geographic agglomeration of economic activities (Hohenberg and Lees, 1985, Quah, 2002).
An increase in agglomeration can have a positive e⁄ect on growth, due to such factors as lower costs
resulting from technological spillovers and greater opportunities for innovation (Keller, 2002, Ja⁄e,
Trajtenberg and Henderson, 2007; Fujita and Thisse, 2003; Fujita et al. 2001; Ciccone, 2002). Baldwin
and Martin (2004) and Martin and Ottaviano (2001) present a model lingking growth and agglom-
eration of economic activities and discuss conditions under growth and agglomeration are mutually
2self-reinforcing processes. In an empirical analysis of cities in the U.S., Germany and China, Betten-
court et al (2007) ￿nd that wages and R&D expenditures are higher in larger cities, whereas Simon
and Love (1990) ￿nd that for most goods, economic cost decreases rather than increases with urban
growth. Early research found that there are an array of urbanization economies in growing cities that
provide amenities to local residents (Moomaw, 1981). In this paper, we concern ourselves only with
growing cities, and assume growth provides bene￿ts to all residents, whether it is in the form of higher
wages, more employment opportunities, or a higher level of amenities.
There are a range of possible models of city growth that could be considered. We pick several cases
that capture plausible outcomes for a growing urban area. We ￿rst assume that the physical limits of the
city are ￿xed. Population growth is endogenous, and determined by the willingness of existing residents
to allow new neighbors to enter their neighborhoods. We then take another case, where population
growth is given, but the city boundary is allowed to vary. That is, it is possible for new residents to
move into the city either into existing neighborhoods or to the periphery. We ￿nd in both types of
cities density will be lower than is optimal. We examine how changes in certain parameters can impact
the results. We look at the e⁄ects of more neighborhoods, of greater infrastructure costs, and of higher
transportation costs in the periphery. Finally we consider possible solutions to the externality problem,
including optimal fees and the more common impact fees which are often used to pay for infrastructure
costs of new development (Ihlanfeldt, and Shaughnessy, 2002; Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003; Nelson
et al., 1991). We ￿nd that there is an optimal subsidy that could induce existing neighborhoods to take
in the welfare maximizing number of new residents. But in most cases, an impact fee on new residents
is not su¢ cient to achieve the optimum - a subsidy is required to induce existing neighborhoods to
admit more residents. The results have implications for cities that may be struggling to reduce urban
sprawl and achieve more compact development.
2 City I: Fixed Boundary, Population Endogenous
We ￿rst assume a simple urban area where the urban boundaries are ￿xed and the population growth is
endogenous. There are constant bene￿ts, b,1 to the city for each new resident admitted to any of the ￿ n
neighborhoods in the city. Further, we assume that these bene￿ts accrue to all the existing residents of
the city, for example in the form of higher wages, more services, or other amenities. Neighborhoods are
de￿ned by the size of the jurisicdiction which has control over development within its boundaries. There
is strong evidence that local neighborhood associations and groups have a great deal of control over land
1This assumption of constant marginal bene￿ts can be modi￿ed with no changes to the results below ￿bene￿ts could
be either diminishing with the number of residents or increasing if there are agglomeration economies.
3use decisions in the USA, although this ability to control new development may di⁄er substantially
across jurisdictions. For the model, the neighborhood is how we identify the jurisdiction that has
e⁄ective control over land use decisions.
We assume there are infrastructure costs, ￿ c; associated with each new resident who locates in an
existing neighborhood. These costs can include utilities such as sewer lines, and road extensions, or
other services such as schools and ￿re or police protection. In addition, new residents impose costs on
the existing residents in any given neighborhood, in the form of congestion costs or other perceived costs
that a⁄ect the quality of life in the neighborhood. The cost ci to each neighborhood i is increasing in
the number of new people admitted. We assume this congestion function is increasing at an increasing
rate with the number of new residents admitted. When there are ￿ n total neighborhoods, we assume
that the congestion costs to each of the existing neighborhoods of allowing more residents to enter is:2
ci = c(ki; ￿ n); (2.0.1)
where
@ci
@ki
> 0;
@2ci
@k2
i
> 0; (2.0.2)
and @ci=@ki ￿ c0(ki; ￿ n):
2.1 City 1 Optimum
Assume the planning authority can costlessly determine the optimal number of new residents that
maximize net bene￿t to the city with a given number of neighborhoods ￿ n. The planner would admit
new residents, k, so that total bene￿ts net of total costs to the city are maximized. The total bene￿ts
are the constant marginal bene￿t per person, b, times the number of new residents (￿ = bk). Total
costs, C, are the summation of the costs across all of the neighborhoods where residents are admitted,
including the congestion costs and infrastructure costs for all k new residents. The problem is to choose
the number of new residents to be located in each neighborhood, ki; that maximizes
Max
ki
(￿ ￿ C) = b
￿ n P
i
ki ￿
￿
￿ n P
i=1
(c(ki; ￿ n) + ￿ cki)
￿
: (2.1.1)
In each neighborhood, the optimal number of residents, k￿
i , is de￿ned by an implicit equation
obtained from the ￿rst order conditions:
2One reader has suggested that we could have used a median voter approach as an alternative way of framing the
problem. If the average resident gets b=p (p is population of the city) in bene￿ts from a new residents and the costs to the
average voter are c=p, then the planner will admit the new resident if b > c. But since each neighborhood must bear the
total costs of each new resident it will tend to block too much. We ￿nd that this median voter approach yields exactly
the same results as the case presented in this paper.
4@(￿ ￿ C)
@ki
￿ H(k￿
i ;￿ c; ￿ n;b) = b ￿ c0 (k￿
i ; ￿ n) ￿ ￿ c = 0; i = 1;:::; ￿ n; (2.1.2)
or where the marginal bene￿t of one more new resident to the city equals the marginal cost in each of
the ￿ n neighborhoods, that is
b = c0 (k￿
i ; ￿ n) + ￿ c; i = 1;:::; ￿ n: (2.1.3)
In each neighborhood there will be k￿
i new residents, and the total new population in the city will be
￿ nk￿
i .
2.2 Outcome with Neighborhood Choice
In most urban areas of the U.S., land use decisions are made at the local level. This includes decisions
about zoning levels that set the minimum lot size or maximum allowable density in an area. Even
when maximum density levels are set by zoning regulations for a parcel of land, local neighborhoods
will often attempt to block new entrants completely, or to at least reduce density below proposed
levels. Therefore, when local jurisdictions are able to determine the number of allowed new residents,
whether it is county level government or local neighborhood associations, the outcome is likely to be
di⁄erent from the optimum. This is because of the externality problem discussed above. Although there
is a bene￿t to all of those in the city when each neighborhood admits another resident, the existing
residents of that neighborhood are not likely to perceive the full bene￿t.
It is di¢ cult to know how the existing residents might perceive their potential bene￿ts; in fact they
may have no understnding about the bene￿ts of growth or believe that some other neighborhood would
take newcomers, in which case they will block new development in their own neighborhood completely.
Here, we take one simple but representative case with ￿ n neighborhoods in the city, and where a single
neighborhood believes that it will receive a proportional share of the bene￿ts of admitting another
resident, or b=￿ n. 3
We assume that the infrastructure costs, ￿ c; for each new resident coming into a neighborhood are
born by all residents of that neighborhood, for example in the form of higher taxes.4 The problem
faced by each neighborhood is then to maximize neighborhood bene￿ts net of cost, or:
Max
ki
￿i =
￿
b
￿ n
￿
ki ￿ c(ki; ￿ n) ￿ ￿ cki; (2.2.1)
where,
@￿i
@ki
￿ G(ki;b; ￿ n;￿ c) = (b=￿ n) ￿ c0 (ki; ￿ n) ￿ ￿ c = 0; i = 1;:::; ￿ n: (2.2.2)
3The marginal bene￿t of an additional resident could be decreasing in ki instead of being constant, but this would not
a⁄ect the result below.
4We will explore other policy options later in the paper.
5Or
b=￿ n = c0 (ki; ￿ n) + ￿ c; i = 1;:::; ￿ n: (2.2.3)
That is, each neighborhood will admit residents up to the point where the value to the neighhor-
hood, b=￿ n, is just equal to the marginal cost to the existing neighborhood residents, including new
infrastructure costs and congestion costs, c0 (ki; ￿ n) + ￿ c.
Comparing the outcomes under the planner￿ s optimum above and this local choice case, we ￿nd that
the city admits fewer new residents when the decision is under neighborhood control, since b > b=￿ n.
In general, the city will have smaller population and development will be less dense than under the
optimum if the perceived bene￿t of admitting a new resident in each neighborhood is less than b.
2.2.1 The e⁄ects of changes in the number of neighborhoods
We examine what happens to the number of new residents admitted as the number of neighborhoods
changes, comparing the social optimum to the outcome under neighborhood choice. We assume that
the congestion function is increasing with the number of neighborhoods, that is
@ci
@￿ n
> 0;
@2ci
@￿ n2 > 0: (2.2.4)
This is because in a city of a given physical size, as the number of neighborhoods goes up, the
spatial size of each neighborhood decreases. Therefore, for a given number of new incoming residents,
the e⁄ect of those residents will be greater the smaller the size of the neighborhoods they are entering.5
With greater number of neighborhoods, ￿ n, we ￿nd that in both the planner￿ s case and the neighborhood
choice case, the number of residents admitted to each neighborhood, ki; decreases as the number of
neighborhoods increases, as shown in Figure 1.6
But we are interested in the relative e⁄ects of increasing ￿ n on the two outcomes. As ￿ n increases the
di⁄erence between the planner￿ s outcome and the local choice is:
5We are assuming that the costs are increasing with the ratio of new residents to existing residents. There are di⁄erent
possible costs that the new residents might impose on the local community. We have focused on one of the most prevalent
￿congestion costs.
6To see the e⁄ect of increasing ￿ n on the outcome when there is neighborhood choice, we take the derivative of the ￿rst
order condition, equation 2.2.2, with respect to the number of neighborhoods, ￿ n, we ￿nd that the number of residents
admitted to each neighborhood, ki; decreases as the number of neighborhoods increases. Assuming that c
00(ki) > 0
(@
2c(ki; ￿ n)=@k
2
i > 0); we obtain that:
@ki
@￿ n
= ￿
@H(:)=@￿ n
@H(:)=@ki
= ￿
c
00
￿ n(ki; ￿ n)
c00
ki(ki; ￿ n)
< 0
Similarly, we take the derivative of the ￿rst order condition of the social planner problem with respect to the number of
neighborhood, ￿ n; and we also ￿nd that ki is a decreasing function of ￿ n.
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￿2 > 0:
Therefore as ￿ n increases the additional population admitted to each neighborhood will be smaller under
the private outcome than under the planner outcome. This suggests the population under the private
outcome will be even smaller relative to the optimum when the number of neighborhood increases. We
show this result in ￿gure 1.
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Figure 1: Cost and bene￿t for neighborhood i of admitting new
residents for city 1 as the number of neighborhoods changes.
For each neighborhood i, the optimal number of residents to admit with the initial number of
neighborhoods ￿ n1 is shown as k￿
1;i, and with the larger number of neighborhoods ￿ n2; it is shown as k￿
2;i:
Likewise, for the case of neighborhood choice, the number of residents admitted will be k1;i when the
number of neighborhoods is ￿ n1, and k2;i when there are more neighborhoods. It is clear that as the
number of neighborhoods increases, the cost function shifts from c(￿ n1) to c(￿ n2), and there is a greater
decrease in the admitted population when local neighborhoods can choose.
Thus, given the type of congestion cost function we have speci￿ed here for incoming residents, cities
where small local areas have control over the amount of development allowed within their boundaries
are likely to be less dense and more spread out than is optimal. In contrast, cities with just a small
number of larger neighborhoods will be more likely to be closer to optimal population size. In the
extreme, one jurisdiction that has control over growth in the entire city will have the incentive to allow
the optimal amount of population growth.
72.2.2 The e⁄ects of changes in the infrastructure costs
We next examine how the number of residents admitted in each neighborhoord changes when there
are higher infrastructure costs for new residents. In both the planner￿ s and neighborhood choice cases,
the number of new residents will be lower as infrastructure costs go up.7 However, the outcome when
there is local control is that the number of new residents will fall by more than under the case where
the planner is making decisions. We can see this in Figure 2 below. The number of new residents
allowed into existing neighborhoods is lower under neighborhood choice before infrastructure costs go
up. The initial optimum number of new residents admitted under the planner￿ s solution is k￿
3;i, while
in the private choice case, the solution is k3;i. When infrastructure costs increase from ￿ c1 to ￿ c2, the
number admitted falls to k￿
4;i for the optimal solution, and to k4;i for the neighborhood choice case.
The reduction is greater under neighborhood choice conditions. Again, as infrastructure costs go up,
the local choice outcome deviates relatively more from the optimal level.8
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Figure 2: Costs and bene￿ts of admitting new residents for city 1 as
the infrastructure cost increases
We can summarize the results for city 1. Under the planner￿ s solution, the city is more densely
7The partial change in the number of new residents with respect to the cost of infrastructure for both the planner case
and the private market case are shown as:
@ki
@￿ c
= ￿
@H(:)=@￿ c
@H(:)=@ki
=
￿1
c00(ki)
< 0; planner
@ki
@￿ c
= ￿
@G(:)=@￿ c
@G(:)=@ki
=
￿ki
c00(ki)
< 0; private
8This result depends on the functional form of the cost function. In our case, the marginal cost of additional resident
is increasing.
8developed with greater population than if control over growth is in￿ uenced by local neighboorhoods.
The extent to which this is true depends on how existing residents see the bene￿ts of admitting new
residents to their own neighborhoods. The larger the number of neighborhoods, or the smaller is
each area that has control over land use, the more the optimal outcome will be di⁄erent from the
neighborhood choice model. And, the higher the infrastructure costs, the fewer new residents are
admitted in both planner and neighborhood control.
3 City 2: Fixed Population Growth; Boundary Variable
An alternative way to model a growing city is to assume there is an exogenous increase in population,
and in-coming residents can locate either in the existing neighborhoods or at the periphery. In this
case the growth rate in population is given, and we examine the di⁄erences between densities and
physical city size in the optimal and local neighborhood choice outcomes. Therefore, we must consider
the costs to locating new residents at the outer edge of the city. We assume these include the costs of
a new system of infrastructure, such as sewers and roads. There is mixed evidence about whether the
cost of infrastructure is higher in outlying regions of urban areas. Much of the planning literature has
argued that the costs of infrastructure for new development are higher for urban areas that grow with
more dispersed density patterns (Brueckner, 1997, and RERC, 1998). There is some evidence from
economics, however, that the issue is more nuanced. Ladd (1992), and Frank (1989) ￿nd that in some
cases, infrastructure costs for new residents in existing urban areas can be higher than for outlying
areas. Given the mixed evidence, we use the simple assumption that infrastructure costs for adding
new residents to the city will be the same, whether they are located in the existing neighborhoods of
the city, or in the outlying areas. However, there is an important way costs are likely to be di⁄erent for
new residents locating in the periphery, and that is they must pay higher transportation costs because
of the more distant location. As a result they would prefer to live in the existing neighborhoods where
we assume they do not have to pay transportation costs.
Again we compare the planner￿ s optimum to the outcome when the decision to admit new residents
is under local control. The social planner will allocate residents to maximize the bene￿ts of new
residents to the entire city. In the case where there is neighborhood choice, new residents can choose
where to locate, but existing neighborhoods are allowed to choose the number of new residents they will
accept, as in Model I above. First, we assume that the existing residents know that the new neighbors
are going to locate somewhere, and that they will bene￿t from the population growth in the city no
matter where the growth occurs. Then, we assume that existing residents might be uncertain whether
new residents will be allowed to locate in some part of the city; or they may feel that they have some
9obligation to admit some new residents to their neighborhoods. We choose these two scenarios to show
the range of possible outcomes.
3.1 The Planner￿ s Outcome.
The planner knows the growth in population, and the question becomes where to locate the residents:
in the existing neighborhoods or in the peripheral areas. We assume that the costs of locating a new
resident in the periphery is the ￿xed infrastructure cost, ￿ c, which is the same as the infrascture costs of
locating a new resident an the existing neighborhood. Also, new residents who locate in the periphery
must pay transportation costs, ￿ cT:
The problem is to choose ke￿
i to be admitted in each existing neighborhood i, i = 1;:::;n; and kp￿
to be admitted in the periphery to maximize net bene￿ts to the city. Because the new population to
be admitted is given, and the new residents will go somewhere, solving the maximization problem is
equivalent to miniziming the total costs of allowing the ￿ k new residents into the urban area, allocating
them to existing neighborhoods and the periphery. Therefore, the planner will minizimize the costs of
admitting new residents into the existing neighborhood by choosing ke￿
i which minimizes the following
equation:
Min
ke
i
￿
￿ n P
i=1
(c(ke
i; ￿ n) + ￿ cke
i)
￿
+
￿
￿ c + ￿ cT￿
￿
￿ k ￿
￿ n P
i=1
ke
i
￿
Given the fact that ￿ k =
￿ n P
i=1
ke
i + kp; the planner will choose the number of new residents, ke￿
i , in
each existing neighborhood according to the following ￿rst order conditions:
V (ke￿
i ;￿ c;￿ cp; ￿ n) ￿ c0(ke￿
i ; ￿ n) + ￿ c ￿
￿
￿ c + ￿ cT￿
= 0; i = 1;:::; ￿ n: (3.1.1)
At equilibrium, the planner will locate new residents in each existing neighborhood up to the point
where the ￿xed cost of a resident in the periphery,
￿
￿ c + ￿ cT￿
; is equated to the marginal cost of locating
an additional resident in an existing neighborhood i, c0(ke￿
i ; ￿ n) + ￿ c: We show this result in Figure 3
below. We designate the optimal number of new residents in each existing neighborhood as ke￿
i and the
optimal number of new residents at the periphery as ￿ k￿ke￿
i ,or kp￿. Given that total population growth
is known, we de￿ne the maximum surplus to the city from growth as b￿ k = b(
￿ n P
i=1
ke￿
i + kp￿):
3.2 Outcome With Neighborhood Choice
We now look at the neighborhood choice outcome for City 2 when there is a ￿xed population growth
but the boundary of the city can vary. New residents can be admitted to existing neighborhoods by city
10residents, or they are able to move into the peripheral areas. We assume they will move into existing
neighborhoods as long as they are allowed to because their costs are lower (no transportation costs).
As described above, we take two possible ways the existing residents perceive the e⁄ects of the new
residents to the city: city 2A and city 2B. We assume in this case that new residents who locate in the
periphery must pay their own infrastructure costs. However, existing neighbhorhoods in this model
pay all infrastructure costs. In the next section we explore the use of impact fees, which require new
development to pay for all infrastructure costs.
City 2A: Existing neighborhoods know new residents will go somewhere in the city or in the
periphery and yield to the city a bene￿t of b per person admitted regardless of where they locate.
City 2B: Existing neighborhoods think they will get some bene￿t from new residents. Assume b=n
is the bene￿t per each new resident admitted.
Under City 2A, because existing residents are aware that new residents are likely to be located
somewhere in the city, and that they will bene￿t without having to admit any new residents to their
own neighborhood, they will block the new comers completely. All new residents will be located in the
periphery, or ke
i = 0; i = 1;:::; ￿ n; and kp = ￿ k: The city physical size will be larger with a lower density
than was the case under the social planner.
It is possible, however, that existing residents may believe they will recieve some bene￿t, or they
could just be uncertain about whether new residents will be allowed to locate somewhere. They
could even believe they should take some share of new residents. To represent City 2B we make the
assumption that existing residents perceive the bene￿ts as their share of the total bene￿t b=￿ n, and
ignore broader bene￿ts to the city as a whole.
The solution for the existing neighborhoods for City 2B is9
ke
i :
b
￿ n
= c0(ke
i; ￿ n) + ￿ c (3.2.1)
Recall from above, equation (3.1.1), that the optimal solution is
ke￿
i : c0(ke￿
i ; ￿ n) = ￿ cT (3.2.2)
Therefore, if b
￿ n ￿ ￿ c < ￿ cT; there will be more people admitted to the existing neighborhoods in the
optimal case than in the private market case. Note that if the perceived bene￿ts of a new resident,
b
￿ n; is less than ￿ c, the infrastructure costs, then no new residents would be admitted. If the perceived
9The maximization problem (neighborhood choice outcome) is as: Max(
b
nk
e
i ￿ci(k
e
i; ￿ n)￿￿ ck
e
i): The ￿rst order conditions
with respect k
e
i are such that
Q(k
e
i; ￿ n;￿ c) ￿
b
￿ n
￿ c
0(k
e
i; ￿ n) ￿ ￿ c = 0; i = 1;:::; ￿ n:
11bene￿t of another resident net of the infrastructure costs are less than the transportation costs, more
new residents will be admitted under the optimal case than under neighborhood choice. If the number
of neighborhoods, ￿ n; is relatively large or transportation costs, ￿ cT, are high, then this is likely to be
true, and the city would be more compact in the optimal or planner case (See Figure 3. The number
admitted to existing neighborhoods is higher in the planner￿ s case).
We now examine the e⁄ects of changes in some of the key assumptions for City 2B. These include
1) higher transportation costs; 2) a larger number of neighborhoods; and 3) higher infrastructure costs
for new residents.
a. Existing neighborhoods b. Periphery
$/resident $/resident
b b
ki
e ki
e* ki
p* ki
p
# of new residents # of new residents
c
n b/
T c c +
) ( ' k c c +
c
T c c +
k
Figure 3. Optimal and Market Outcomes in Existing Neighborhoods and the Periphery for city 2B
3.2.1 The e⁄ects of changes in transportation costs
If transportation costs are higher for new residents who must locate in the periphery, then under
the social planner outcome each existing neighborhood will take more new residents.10 This is because
overall costs will be minimized when more residents are located in the existing city. Fewer new residents
will locate in the periphery and the city will be more densely developed and less spread out.
Under either of the private market cases described above, the number of new residents admitted
into existing neighborhoods will be unchanged when transportation costs go up. In the case where
10From the social planner optimum, equation (3.1.1), recall that
V (k
￿e
i ;￿ c;￿ c
p; ￿ n) ￿ c
0(k
￿e
i ; ￿ n) + ￿ c ￿
￿
￿ c + ￿ c
T
￿
= 0; i = 1;:::; ￿ n;
From this equation, we can obtain the partial derivatives of k
￿e
i with respect ￿ c
T as follows:
@k
￿e
i
@￿ cT = ￿
@V (:)=@￿ c
T
@V (:)=@k￿e
i
=
1
c00
kk(k￿e
i ; ￿ n)
;
which is positive. If transportation costs increase, more new residents are admitted to each existing neighborhood, and
fewer new residents will locate in the periphery.
12existing neighborhoods do not take any new residents (City 2A), clearly transportation cost changes
will not matter. In the case where existing neighborhoods admit residents because they believe their
bene￿ts will be b=￿ n (City 2B), then transportation cost changes to new residents in the periphery also
do not matter in their decisions, because we assume these costs are paid by the incoming residents.
Therefore, the higher are the transportation costs from the periphery, the greater will be the
di⁄erence between the social optimum and the market outcome. Higher transportation costs will tend
to make the optimal city small and more dense and has no impact on the city when decisions are made
by local residents.
3.2.2 The e⁄ects of changes in the number of neighborhoods
We next examine changes in the number of neighborhoods. As in our analysis of City 1 above, we
assume that when there are more neighhorhoods, (￿ n is larger), then each neighborhood is smaller in
size. Therefore, the congestion costs of admitting any given number of new residents will be greater
(2.2.4). For the planner case, we ￿nd the partial derivative of k￿e
i with respect to ￿ n as follows:
@k￿e
i
@￿ n
= ￿
@V (:)=@￿ n
@V (:)=@k￿e
i
= ￿
@c0(ke
i; ￿ n)=@￿ n
@c0(k￿e
i ; ￿ n)=@k￿e
i
= ￿
c00
k￿ n(k￿e
i ; ￿ n)
c00
kk(k￿e
i ; ￿ n)
When there are a greater number of neighborhoods in the existing city, then the number of new residents
admitted to each neighborhood will decrease. As in City 1 above, this is because costs of each admitted
resident are higher in the existing neighborhoods, and the cost minimizing distribution of new residents
will have fewer in the existing areas and more in the periphery.
With neighborhood choice we again examine the outcomes with City 2A and City 2B assumptions.
Under 2A, where existing residents block new residents completely, then the e⁄ect on city size of
more neighborhoods makes no di⁄erence. A greater number of neighborhoods would actually make the
optimal con￿guration of the city more similar to the market outcome, but the optimal city is still more
compact than that which would result from complete blocking.
With City 2B, where existing residents see the bene￿t of new residents as b=￿ n, recall that the
neighborhood choice equilibrium is given by ke
i : b=￿ n = c0(ke
i; ￿ n)+￿ c: Taking the derivative of the above
equation with respect to ￿ n, we have
@ke
i
@￿ n
= ￿
@Q(:)=@￿ n
@Q(:)=@ke
i
= ￿
￿
b=￿ n2 + c00
k￿ n(ke
i; ￿ n)
￿
c00
kk(ke
i; ￿ n)
Comparing this result to the outcome for the social planner above, we ￿nd that though both are
negative, the e⁄ect under neighborhood choice is larger in magnitude than under the optimal case above.
Therefore, as ￿ n gets larger, the decline in the number of new residents admitted under neighborhood
13choice will be larger than under the optimal case, or the neighborhood choice outcome is relatively
more sprawling compared to the optimal con￿guration.
3.2.3 The e⁄ects of changes in the infrastructure costs
Finally, we compare the optimal and neighborhood choice outcomes for the city when infrastructure
costs are higher. There would be no change on the city outcome for the social planner from a change
in infrastructure costs. This is because the population increase is given, and the infrastructure costs in
our model are the same for new residents in the existing neighborhoods and in the periphery.
In City 2A in which existing residents block new residents completely, there would also be no change
if infrastructure costs go up. In City 2B where existing residents see their bene￿ts as b=￿ n, however,
there will be an e⁄ect of higher infrastructure costs. Rewriting equations 3.2.1,
Q(ke
i;￿ c; ￿ n) ￿ b=￿ n ￿ c0(ke
i; ￿ n) ￿ ￿ c = 0; 8i = 0;:::; ￿ n
and taking the derivative of the above system with respect to ￿ c, we have
@ke
i
@￿ c
= ￿
@Q(:)=@￿ c
@V (:)=@ke
i
= ￿
1
c00
kk(ke
i; ￿ n)
:
If infrasture costs are higher, the number of residents admitted to the existing neighborhoods will be
lower. Therefore, the di⁄erence between the optimal city size and city size under neighborhood choice
will be even greater. The resulting city will be less dense and more spread out relative to the social
planner￿ s optimum.
We can summarize the results of the City 2 models in which population growth is given and new
residents can locate either in the existing neighborhoods or in the periphery. We ￿nd that when
neighborhoods can limit entry, their perception of the bene￿ts new residents bring may in￿ uence how
spread out the city will be compared to the optimum. When residents block completely, as in City 2A,
the optimal outcome is always more dense and less spread out. Even when existing residents perceive
some bene￿t from new residents, the same result will hold except if transportation costs are very large
relative to the perceived net bene￿t of new residents to the neighborhood. And, as in City 1, we ￿nd
that the larger the number of neighborhoods and the higher the infrastructure costs, the more spread
out the city will be relative to the optimum. Higher transportation costs will have a similar e⁄ect,
contributing to relatively lower density and greater sprawl.
Next, we turn to various policy options for improving the market outcomes in both the Model 1
city where the urban boundary is ￿xed, and in Model 2 where population is ￿xed and the boundary
can vary.
144 Policies
4.1 The optimal subsidy
4.1.1 City 1: Population is endogenous and the city boundary is ￿xed
We ￿rst examine optimal subsidies that would make the outcome of city population and density under
neighborhood choice the same as the social optimum. The decision-maker or central authority will give a
subsidy, ￿; to each of the ￿ n neighborhoods for each new resident it admits.11 The maximization problem
for each neighborhood is then to choose the number of new residents to admit, ki, that maximizes the
net bene￿t to the neighborhood,
￿
b
￿ n
￿
ki ￿ (c(ki; ￿ n) ￿ ￿ki) ￿ ￿ cki:
The ￿rst order condition for an optimum with the subsidy is
b
￿ n
+ ￿ ￿ c0(k￿
i ; ￿ n) ￿ ￿ c = 0 (4.1.1)
Using equation (2.1.2) and (4.1.1), we solve for the optimal level of compensation; ￿￿; needed for the
private outcome to coincide with the optimal one, that is:
￿￿ = b ￿
b
￿ n
We can show the magnitude of this subsidy in ￿gure 4. The optimal number of new residents is k￿
i ,
and the market outcome is ki. A per new resident subsidy of (b￿(b=￿ n)) would induce the neighborhood
to accept the optimal number of new residents. The city would have ￿ n(k￿
i ￿ ki) more residents than
the private market case, and would have greater density in every neighborhood.
$/resident
b
ki ki
*
# of new residents
net saving
) ( ' k c c +
n b/
c
* t
Figure 4. Outcome with Neighborhood choice and optimal subsidy for city 1
11Revenues to pay the subsidy could be raised by a city-wide tax on income accruing to all residents of the city as a
result of urban growth.
15There are several interesting implications of the optimal tax in City 1. First, if there is only one
neighborhood, then optimal decisions get made for the whole city, and there is no need for a subsidy.
Second, the larger the number of neighborhoods, then the larger the subsidy, ￿, must be. If there are
a large number of jurisdictions able to make their own decisions about development density, then the
private market outcome is likely to be farther from the optimum, and any subsidy will have to be
larger. However, even with large numbers of neighborhoods, it is possible to o⁄er a subsidy to the
neighorhoods that will make each better o⁄.
City 2: Population growth is given, and the city boundary can vary
4.1.2 Optimal subsidy under Model 2A
For City 2A, when existing residents know that there are new residents coming into the city somewhere,
they may choose to block new development, and all of the new residents ￿ k would have to locate in
the periphery. At the optimum there will be ke￿
i new residents admitted to each neighborhood, with
kp￿ = ￿ k￿
P
ke￿
i located in the periphery. Therefore, the optimal subsidy for the existing neighborhoods
that would induce them to admit the optimal number is ￿￿ = ￿ cT + ￿ c for each new resident admitted.
We show the optimal and market outcomes in Figure 5, and the optimal subsidy ￿￿: With ￿￿; the net
savings to each existing neighborhood would be area A, or a total city-wide net savings = ￿ nA. The
bene￿ts to the city are the same under either policy.
a. Existing neighborhoods b. Periphery
$/resident $/resident
b b
A Net Saving
ki
e* ki
p*
# of new residents # of new residents
c
T c c +
) ( ' k c c +
c
T c c +
k }
* t
Figure 5. Optimum Subsidy for City 2A.
164.1.3 Optimal subsidy under Model 2B.
In the planner case the optimal solution is characterized by the following ￿rst order condition from
equation 3.1.4 above.
c0(ke￿
i ; ￿ n) + ￿ c ￿
￿
￿ c + ￿ cT￿
= 0; i = 1;:::; ￿ n; or
c0(ke￿
i ; ￿ n) = ￿ cT; i = 1;:::; ￿ n:
Under Model 2B, we assume that existing residents are not sure about whether they would be
entirely able to free ride, and in fact perceive neighborhood bene￿ts for admitting each new resident as
b=￿ n. The ￿rst order condition for an optimum with subsidy is then given by b
￿ n = c0(ke
i; ￿ n)￿￿ + ￿ c; and
the optimal subsidy for existing neighborhoods is ￿￿ = (￿ c ￿ b
￿ n) + ￿ cT; where ￿ cT is the additional cost of
admitting a new resident to the city at the periphery instead of in the existing neighborhoods, and ￿ c￿ b
￿ n
is the additional cost a new resident imposes on residents of existing neighborhoods.
The neighborhoods must be compensated at least as much as the costs they bear per new resident,
and enough to o⁄set the higher costs if new residents must go to the periphery and pay transportation
costs. We can show that ￿￿will be a subsidy when ￿ cT + ￿ c > b
￿ n, and a tax otherwise, as this can be
seen in ￿gure 5 below. If the perceived bene￿t is less than the opportunity cost, then the neighborhood
should be subsidized by ￿￿ for each new resident. The net savings for the neighborhood is given below.
a. Existing neighborhoods b. Periphery
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Figure 6. Optimum subsidy for City 2B
It is likely that perceived bene￿ts will be low, and may appraoch zero if existing residents are aware
that subsidies will be paid for incoming residents. In fact, with a subsidy, the outcome under City 2B
is likely to approach that of City 2A. If local residents realize they will be compensated for admitting
new residents, they would be unlikely to admit any without such compensation.
174.2 Impact Fees
An alternative to subsidies is the policy of requiring incoming residents to pay for their own cost of
infrastructure, a tax often refered to as an "impact fee". Local jursidictions often impose these types
of fees on developers of new housing. We examine how the policy of using impact fees compares to the
optimal subsidy for both City 1 and City 2.
4.2.1 Impact Fees in City 1.
If new residents must pay for their own infrastructure costs, existing neighborhoods will perceive the
costs of a new household as just the congestion costs they impose, c(ki; ￿ n): Each neighborhood would
then admit new residents to maximize net bene￿ts to the neighborhood. Assuming, as we did above
for City 1, that existing neighborhoods perceive the bene￿ts as b
￿ n, then they will admit new residents
as long as the costs are less than the perceived bene￿t, or:
b=￿ n = c0 (ki; ￿ n) (4.2.1)
Alternatively, if the perceived bene￿t is zero, no new residents will be admitted.
It is important to ask whether the e⁄ects of impact fees are likely to be equivalent to the optimal
subsidy derived above. Or, under what conditions is the optimal subsidy under the planner￿ s solution
(2.1.2) larger than a simple impact fee (new residents pay their own infrastructure costs (4.2.1))? The
impact fee will be too small compared to the optimal subsidy if the following condition holds:
￿ c 6 b ￿
b
￿ n
: (4.2.2)
If the number of neighborhoods, ￿ n, is large, or if the bene￿t to the whole city, b; of admitting another
resident is large relative to the infrastructure cost of that resident, ￿ c, then this condition will hold and
the city under the optimum will have larger population size and be more dense than under local control,
even when new residents pay their own infrastructure costs. However, for all ￿ n; if ￿ c is greater than b
(b is very small) then the condition in equation (4.2.2) is violated, and existing neighborhoods could
actually admit more new residents than is optimal. For example, if infrastructure costs, ￿ c; are greater
than b, then the planner would not admit any new residents, but individual neighborhoods might if
they perceived some bene￿t.12
To summarize, for City 1, impact fees will result in existing neighborhoods taking in more new
residents, but it is unlikely that these fees will be high enough to induce them to take in the optimal
12The condition in equation 4.2.2 could also be violated if the number of neighborhoods, ￿ n; is small and b does not
exceed ￿ c by much.
18number of new residents especially in growing cities where b is very large. Impact fees will, in most
cases, be too small compared to what is needed for an optimal subsidy, and the city will be less dense
and have lower population than is optimal. Existing neighborhoods will have to be subsidized more
than the amount of the infrastructure costs to take in new residents, especially when the number of
neighborhoods is large, and/or the bene￿ts of admitting new residents are relatively large.
4.2.2 Impact Fees City 2.
We ￿nd a similar outcome with impact fees in City 2. In City 2, because population growth is given,
the issue is to determine how many households will locate in existing neighborhoods and how many
will locate in the periphery. The optimal subsidy to o⁄er existing residents to admit new households for
both City 2A and 2B reduces to ￿ cT + ￿ c as derived above. If those incoming households pay their own
infrastructure costs as they would under an impact fee, this would not be enough of a subsidy compared
to the optimum. The city would be too spread out, and less dense than optimal under the impact fee.13
In reality most impact fees charged for new development are not high enough to cover even the cost of
infrastructure for that new development. These results suggest not only that full impact fees should
be paid, but in addition a subsidy should be paid for each new resident existing areas take in. In this
stylized model, the additional subsidy needed is equivalent to the higher costs of transportation that
the new residents must pay if they locate in the periphery of the urban area.
5 Conclusion
This paper attempts to illustrate the e⁄ect of an externality in urban development using a simple
model to depict city and neighborhood choice over how many new residents to admit to a growing city.
The externality is that cities with growing populations often confer bene￿ts to the entire region, but
existing neighborhoods who must accommodate new entrants bear almost all of the costs. We attempt
to show how the density of the urban area will be di⁄erent when local areas have control over entry
compared to an optimum outcome. Because of the externality, the city will be less dense and more
sprawling than is optimal in almost all of the cases we examined. And, the problem is worse when the
number of neighborhoods who can exert control over land use is greater, and when infrastructure and
transportation costs are higher.
There are many market failures that contribute to urban sprawl, but this is one that may be
important as communities consider ways to achieve greater density and reduce what they perceive as
13In this stylized model, the additional subsidy needed is equivalent to the higher costs of transportation that the new
residents must pay if they locate in the periphery of the urban area.
19sprawl. The problem of existing residents objecting to and attempting to block new development is
always cited as one of the biggest, if not the biggest obstacle to higher density development in urban
areas. This model takes a ￿rst step in considering e⁄ective policies for dealing with this issue. We
have shown that there is a subsidy that will result in higher net welfare for all of the neighborhoods,
and for the city as a whole. We also ￿nd that impact fees, which are fees to pay for infrastructure for
new development are unlikely to be high enough to induce existing neighborhoods to accept e¢ cient
numbers of new residents. Subsidies over and above impact fees for adding new residents may result
in improvements of overall welfare in growing cities.
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